THE  CAPITAL ASSET  CONCEPT: A CRITIQUE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: II by MILLER, PETER
THE "CAPITAL ASSET" CONCEPT: A CRITIQUE OF
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: !1"
PETER MILLER-
THE capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code presume:
(1) that "investment" gains can be satisfactorily distinguished from
"business" and "speculative" profits, and (2) that "investment" gains
deserve favored treatment. Part I of this article has demonstrated
that in practice the attempted segregation of investment gains has
been unsuccessful. The following discussion evaluates the principal
arguments put forward in support of the thesis that investment gains
should be taxed more leniently than income received in other forms.
VI. THE RATIONALE OF THE CAPITAL GAiNs PRovisIoNS-
WHY THE LAw SEEKS TO FAVOR "INVESTMENT"
The special treatment accorded to "investment" gains is usually
supported by two types of argument. One asserts that to apply
ordinary surtax rates to such gains would be inequitable. The other
claims that to do this would impede the efficient operation of the na-
tional economy.'
A. ARGUmENTS CONCERNING FAIRNEss
The first type of argument seeks to establish the proposition that
capital gains do not represent an increase in ability to pay comparable
to that represented by an equal amount of "ordinary income" and that
therefore it is unfair to tax capital gains to the same extent.
1. Taxing Se'zeral Years' Gains in One
According to one line of argument, a profit realized upon the sale of
property which has gradually 2 appreciated in value over a period of
Part I of this article appears at 59 YALE L.J. 837 (1950).
,Member of the New York Bar.
1. Both of these lines of thought are implicit in the Report of the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended the enactment of the initial capital gain provisions in
1921: "The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now seriously re-
tarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series of years are under the present
raw taxed as a lump sum in the year in which the profit is realized. Many such sales, %,ith
their possible profit-taking and consequent increase in the tax revenue, have been blocked by
this feature of the present law." H.R. REP. No. 350, PAnr 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-Il
(1921). Despite perennial re-examination of the capital gains provisions, this elliptical
utterance remains the authoritative statement as to their justification.
2. Although most commentators assume for illustrative simplicity that gains and
losses accrue gradually over the holding period, in many factual situations this is obviously
not so. Where the market value of a capital asset remains at cost for ten years and then un-
dergoes a sharp increase or decrease which induces its sale, it is hard to see why the gain or
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more. than one year is properly attributable, in part, to each of the
years during which it accrued. Accordingly, the inclusion of the full
amount of such a profit with the seller's other income for the year of
the sale would give an artificially inflated measure of the change in the
seller's economic well-being during that year2 Because "ordinary in-
come" is subject to progressive surtax rates, "cashing in" on several
years' profits would result in a substantially higher tax than if a tax
had been paid each year on the unrealized appreciation in value as it
accrued.' It is therefore deemed unfair to tax capital gains at grad-
uated rates.
As has already been indicated in Part I,' this argument is no longer
valid because favorable treatment is now accorded to capital gains
accruing over only six months and one day.' However, even during
the period from 1922 to 1942 7 when the minimum holding period ex-
ceeded one year, a thoroughgoing application of this argument would
have required mitigation of the effect of all "bunched income"-not
only profit realized upon the sale of property, but also dividends,
royalties, compensation for personal services, and all other types of
income arising over a period longer than the taxable year.' Nor did
this policy of mitigating the tax on "bunched income" justify the
distinction made between gain realized upon the sale of "business"
property and that realized upon sale of an "investment." Perhaps
the businessman is more likely to "turn over" stock in trade within
less than one year than is the investor to resell a security within a
year after its acquisition. If so, it could be argued that investors as a
loss should be treated for tax purposes as accruing evenly over the ten-year holding period.
Yet the eradication of this anomaly would probably be administratively unfeasible. CJ.
PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 272 (1946).
3. The classic definition of income for tax purposes is "the money value of the net accre-
tion of one's economic power between two points in time." Haig, The Concept of Income,
c. I of THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Columbia University symposium, 1921). Cf. the defini-
tions of taxable income in SIMoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 206 (1938) and HEwn'r,
THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITS APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION 34 (1925).
4. "The tax on capital gains should approximate the tax which would have been paid
if the gain had been realized in uniform annual amounts over the period during which the
asset was held." The capital gains provisions fail to attain this objective because they "give
the same relief in the case of the sale of an asset held for 2 years as they do in the case of an
asset held for 20 years." SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES OF TRY,
DiviSION OF INvESTIGATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
71st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1929).
5. See Part I, note 23.
6. Professor Lowndes regards the shortening of the holding period as having removed
"the one really meritorious argument in favor of special tax treatment for capital gains."
Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses under the Federal Income Tax, 26
TEXAS L. REv. 440, 442 (1948).
7. Revenue Act of 1921, §206(a) (6), 42 STAT. 233 (1921); Revenue Act of 1938,
§ 117(a) (4), 52 STAT. 501 (1938).
8. See note 11 infra; cf. INT. REv. CODE § 107.
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class have greater need for protection from the tax consequences of the
piling up of accrued profits in the year of sale. This line of reasoning,
however, depends not only upon a correlation between "investments"
and long-accruals but also upon an identification of "capital assets"
with "investments." As the preceding Sections of this discussion have
indicated, the capital gain (and loss) provisions cover far more than
the hypothetical "investment" of the hypothetical "investor." There-
fore it does not appear that these provisions (1) merely prevent hard-
ship when they apply, and (2) apply whenever hardship would other-
wise occur.9 On the contrary it would seem that if the adjudicated
cases prove anything,10 they prove that trouble will brew whenever
special treatment is accorded to particular kinds of personal income. "
2. "Addition to Capital" Versus "Incone"
Many types of arguments attempt to demonstrate that "capital
gains" are inherently unlike the kinds of receipts that represent tax-
paying ability. It has often been said that "addition to capital" is not
"income" 12-"income" having been defined so as to exclude "addition
9. This is well illustrated by the case of Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C 153 (1948),
wherein the Commissioner argued unsuccessfully that the capital gains provisions were in-
tended to mitigate the hardship of taxing "the realization in one lump sum in one taxable
year of an increment in value which had taken place over a number of years" and that there-
fore these provisions should not apply to sales proceeds received in installments continuing
for several years.
10. An analysis of judicial decisions on almost any phase of the law invariably invites
the criticism that, except where facts are in dispute, most of the situations -which get to the
courts are aberrational rather than typical and that therefore any generalization from what
the courts have done is not based upon a representative sampling. Cf. statement of Mr.
Eustace Seligman in CArrrAL GArms T-_xAToN 45 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). Ac-
cording to this argument, bad cases do not necessarily indicate bad law but merely that gen-
eral rules, designed to achieve salutary results in the great majority of situations, sometimes
work unfairly in the unusual cases reported in judicial opinion . "What is needed is sub-
stantial justice in the majority of instances." Darrell, Recent Dcvelopments in Nontaxable
Reorganications and Stock Dividends, 61 Haxv. L. RP-v. 958, 975 (1948). Pragmatically this
line of thought is dangerous; by inducing acquiescence to the legal status quo it dulls our
awareness that the aim of the law is to do justice-even among taxpayers in borderline cases.
11. If all income were averaged over a period of years, it would not be inequitable to
apply graduated surtax rates to investment gains arising over several years. Snso-.s. P,-
SONAL INcOME TAxATION 154 (1938) ; Vicrxiy, AGENDA 0Fo P oarEssivE TAX.AToN 145
(1947) ; Bravman, Equalication of Tar on All Individuals nuth Sae Aggregate Income
Over Same Number of Years, 50 COL. L. Rnv. 1, 23-6 (1950) ; Atlas, Capital Gains Taxa-
tion, 13 Accouxn=G REmw 346, at 352, 354 (1938); DeWind, Preferred Stock
"Bail-Outs" and the Income Tax, 62 HAR . L. REv. 1126, 1133 (1949). GnovFs,
PoswTvA TAxATION A.N EcoNomic PnOGRnss 226 (1946). It should be observed, however,
that "It]he present 25 per cent rate is hardly a substitute for averaging. If we had an aver-
aging system which also covered capital gains, for many people the rates on capital gains
would be over 80 per cent even though it was a rate obtained by averaging." Stanley S. Sur-
rey in CArITAL GAINS TAXATION 47-8 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
12. Although the Supreme Court long ago decided that addition to capital was embraced
within the term "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, Merchants' Loan and Trust
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to capital." 13 Thus Professor Plehn asserts that "[i]ncome is essentially
wealth available for recurrent consumption, recurrently (or periodi-
cally) received. Its three essential characteristics are: receipt, recurrence
and expendability." 14 From this definition it follows that "gains and
profits from transactions outside of one's regular vocation or line of
business, like the profit from the sale of a home,'" are of doubtful in-
come character." 16
Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the dichotomy is still asserted to be a fact of economic
life. Thus Mr. Elisha M. Friedman asserts: "There is no point of similarity between capi-
tal gains and income except that they both are expressed in dollars and a taxpayer receives
them. They are as similar as pigs and pig-iron. A tax on capital gains is a tax on capital."
Memorandum in Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 6358, 77th, Cong.,
2d Sess. 1656, 1663 (1942).
The specious metaphor in which income is compared to the fruit of a tree and capital
gain to the growth of a tree is refuted by Havirr, TIIE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITS At,-
PLICATION TO FEDERAL TAXATION 27-8 (1925). The historical origin of this metaphor is dis-
cussed by Seltzer, Evoltion of the Special Legal Status of Gains lnder the Income Tax, 3
NAT. TAX J. 18 (1950).
13. This position was elaborated in great detail by the late Irving Fisher in Tit NATUnv
OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906) ; THE INCOME CONCEPT IN THE LIGHT or EXPMIERNCe
(1927) ; Double Taxation of Savings, 29 Am. EcoN. REv. 16 (1939). Fisher's arguments
are refuted by Musgrave, A Further Note on the Double Taxation of Savings, 29 All. EcoN.
REv. 549 (1939) ; SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 89-100,225-31 (1938).
14. Plehn, Income as Recurrent, Consumable tReceipts, 14 At. EcoN. REv. 1, 5 (1924),
discussed in Lutz, Should Capital Gains be Taxed as Income?, 22 BULL. NAT. TAX Ass'N
130 (1937).
15. The sale of a home is hardly typical of transactions outside of one's regular vocation
or line of business. "The great bulk of capital gains realized in the United States is realized
in connection with transactions entered into for profit. The sale of houses and farms which
had previously been occupied or operated by their owners occasions many individual realiza-
tions of capital gains; but the great mass even of casual gains is derived from the sale of
corporate securities, unimproved real estate, business properties, and other assets which had
been acquired with a view to profitable investment." Report of Subcommittee, Hearings be-
fore Committee on Ways and Means on Proposed Tax Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 30
(1938).
Notwithstanding this fact, opponents of capital gains taxation have often sought to
demonstrate its alleged unfairness by citing the case of the homeowner who realizes a gain
upon sale of his house when obliged to move to another community, and who later finds him-
self unable to buy a similar house because the sales proceeds are depleted by the capital
gains tax. See the discussion of price level changes below. However, this illustration indi-
cates merely a special situation deserving special treatment. An appropriate solution would
be to exempt completely the gain upon such a sale if the sales proceeds were reinvested in a
new house within a reasonable period. Cf. IxT. REV. CODE § 112(f) ; PAUL, TAXATION FOR
PROSPERITY 273 (1946) ; Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the
Federal Income Tax, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 440, 455 (1948). This would also eliminate the
argument that it is unfair not to permit the deduction of losses incurred upon the sale of a
residence because any gain realized on such a transaction is subject to tax. Cf. Nelson, The
Question of Taxing Capital Gains: The Case Against Taxation, 7 LAW & CONTEm'. P1'on,
208,216 (1940).
16. Plehn, supra note 14, at 10. Another variant of this argument (that capital gains
should not be taxed because prudence forbids their being spent for consumption purposes)
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But is "anticipated recurrence" an appropriate criterion to apply in
defining income for tax purposes? 17 Is income "any the less potent be-
cause it happens to come in one splash rather than a regular flow"? 11
It is, of course, arguable that Professor Plehn's hypothetical reasonably
prudent man in the street would not feel safe in entering into a long-
term lease for a more expensive residence, merely because during the
year he had realized some non-recurrent gains. But is not this example
little more than a restatement of the contention that "income" should
be restricted to mean only expenditures available for consumption, 19 a
point of view which is no more that of the average man than it is that
of most of the economists who have considered the subject. !
Under Professor Plehn's definition, special treatment of "invest-
ment" gains would be justified only to the extent that their recurrence
is less predictable than the recurrence of "speculative" or "business"
profits. Yet such a definition proves too much; rigorously applied it
would exclude from income many non-recurrent receipts arising from
"speculative" or "business" transactions.
3. "Nbcessity" of Reinvesting the Entire Sales Proceeds
Because the six-month minimum holding period is customarily
justified as a means of segregating "investment" gains from "specula-
is that "the great bulk of capital gains are lost," i.e., will eventually be offset by losses.
George 0. May in CArrAL GAINS TAXATION 21, 22 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
Thus Professor Lutz remarks: "It would shock some people to think of excluding from the
income tax those who may be fortunate enough to take a profit in a lucky speculation in
stocks or commodities, while continuing to tax more sober or more cautious folk on their
salaries, rents and interest. In reply, it may be said, paraphrasing the old saying about
those who live by the sword, that those who stay in the market long enough usually come out
losers. In that day, they will have no benefit from their losses as an offset against their
regular income." Lutz, Should Capital Gains be Taxed as Incomef, 22 BuLL. NAT. TAx
Ass'x 130, 134-5 (1937). One fallacy of this argumeht that two wrongs make a right is that
there may be little or no "regular income" to be offset by capital losses. Further-
more, the argument fails to explain why the man who does not stay in the market long
enough to "die by the sword" should pay no tax on his "lucky speculation."
17. Professor Shoup does not think so. "I have never attached much importance to the
annual character of the thing taxed or its recurring nature, and am inclined simply to com-
pare individuals year by year on changes in their economic status, whether or not it come-s
under annual, recurring, or extraordinary changes, just so the change in relative economic
command of economic resources is real." CArrrAL GAnrs TAXAnoi 79 (Tax Institute
Symposium, 1946). Cf. the definitions of income in note 3 supra and Part 1, note 154.
18. GRovEs, TROLBLE Srors IN TA-xATIoN 65 (1948).
19. To constitute income, Plehn requires a receipt merely to be "available for recurrent
consumption"; Fisher requires that it be actually consumed. See note 13 supra. However
both would leave out of account for tax purposes receipts representing additional command
over economic resources.
20. Cf. Musgrave, A Further Note on the Double Taxation of Savings, 29 Am. Ecox.
Rnv. 549 (1939), and Simons, PERsONAL Ixcosm TAxATION 89-100, 225-31 (1938).
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tive" profits, 21 the present law appears to assume that there is some-
thing unique about such "investment" gains which merits special tax
treatment. In support of this assumption, the argument is made that
the investor who bought at 20 and sold at 30 six months later must
reinvest all of his $10 gain if the income from a second investment
yielding the same rate of return is not to be smaller than that from
the first investment. 2 From this truism, the conclusion is drawn
that the $10 profit does not represent any increase in the investor's
ability to pay and that it is unfair for the government to take up to
25% of the $10. The validity of this argument depends, of course,
on what caused the $10 rise in price.
The rise may reflect the accumulation of undistributed corporate
earnings. Because such earnings were not reported in the personal
tax returns of the various stockholders, the latter have enjoyed an
"accretion of economic power" 23 free of progressive tax rates.24 The
net yield from their investments has therefore been augmented, at
least temporarily, by the use of the money which would have been paid
to the Government if stockholders, like partners, 25 were currently
liable for tax on the full earnings of their collective enterprise. However
when a stockholder disposes of his investment at a price reflecting the
accumulated corporate earnings, 26 a tax is levied upon the resultant
capital gain. True, this tax will cause the income from the reinvested
proceeds to be less than that of the original investment. However, this
does not render it an arbitrary levy upon a mere change in the form of
the taxpayer's investment. 27 Rather it is a belated and incomplete
21. See Part I, note 24.
22. The taxpayer "in the 80 per cent bracket . . . can sell his stuff at a tax cost of 25
per cent of the gain .... What does he do with the proceeds, the 75 per cent he has left? He
invests in income-yielding securities and still pays 80 per cent. Where does he get off?"
Professor Seltzer in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 55 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). Cf.
Cole, Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses for Income Tax Purposes, 14 TAx MaO. 583,
584 (1936).
23. See Professor Haig's definition of income, supra note 3.
24. Thus Justice Holmes observed: "The income tax laws do not profess to embody per-
fect economic theory. They ignore some things that either a theorist or a business man would
take into account in determining the pecuniary condition of the taxpayer .... A stockholder
does not pay for accumulated profits of his corporation unless he receives a dividend." Weiss
v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929).
The statement in the text is, of course, subject to qualification depending on a choice of
assumptions as to (a) the shifting and incidence of the present federal corporate income tax
and (b) the relationship between the rates of that tax and the surtax rates applicable to the
incomes of individual investors.
25. INT. R v. CODE § 182.
26. The price of the stock may well be less than its book value, especially where the stock
constitutes merely a minority interest. Cf. Estate of Charles W. Heppenstall, Sr., 8 T.C.M.
136 (1949).
27. "[Tjhe tax . . . is not upon the income [i.e., the accrual of unrealized appreciation
in value?] but is upon the act of the . . . owner in selling. While it may be pos-
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recognition of an accrued but hitherto untaxed increase in the tax-
payer's "economic power." Therefore the diminution of income on
reinvestment does not, in and by itself, seem avalid reason for treating
the capital gain more favorably than a dividend or other "ordinary"
income.
4. Changes in the General Price Level
There seems little dissent from the proposition that "[tihe man who
sells an asset at twice its cost but at no more in purchasing power than
he paid for it, gets a truly illusory gain." 28 From this the conclusion
is often drawn that such gains are not a proper measure of taxpaying
ability.Y This conclusion is highly questionable.
"If everyone were equally affected by the price level change the
gain would be illusory .... [But] the gain is not illusory if some
persons benefit from the change and others do not- if some are
able to cushion the impact of the change because of the amount and
character of the assets they own and can dispose of, while others are
not so fortunate.31
"Should we take account of the disparity by regarding the person
possessing a fixed income as having suffered a hardship, and the
person who disposes of stocks at a higher price due to a change in
the price level as having received no taxable gain? Or, since we do
not give tax effect to the change in the position of the former group,
should we [not] take account of the comparative benefit received by
sible to justify the imposition of some kind of a tax on the act of selling plus realizing the
profit in money or some other form of property, it does not seem that there is any justification
for treating the profit as income merely because there has been a change in the nature of the
property." Cole, Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses for Income Tax Purposes, 14 TAx
MAG. 583, 585 (1936).
This argument is inconsistent with that put forward by another opponent of capital gains
taxation to justify the deduction of losses where the taxpayer acquires substantially similar
property at the same time and at the same low price at which he makes the sale. (Cf. INT.
REv. CODE §§ 23(j) and 118). "Calmly viewed, a wash sale is as much of a decretion to eco-
nomic power as any other sale, for the sale transaction is merely the registration of a decline
in value that has already actually occurred." Lutz, Should Capital Gains be Taxed as In-
come?, 22 Buri. NAT. TAx Ass'sr 130, 134 (1937). This argument would seem to imply that
where gain rather than loss is realized, a tax is justified because there has been a registration
of an increase in value that has already occurred.
28. Professor Groves in CAPrrAL GAiNs TA.:ATIO 64 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946). Cf. Professor Seltzer, id. at 8-9; HEwirr, THE DEFINITIO'N ON INCoM= Am rrs
APPLrcAToN rN FEDERAL. TAxATIoN 33 (1925).
29. "The dollar shifts, and if you tax capital gains a hundred per cent instead of only on
that part of the capital gain which is not caused by the change in the value of the dollar, you
produce a result which I think is most unfair." Eustace Seligman in CAPITAL GAUns TAxA-
TioN 76 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). Cf. George 0. May, id. at 22; Professor Carl
Shoup, id. at 24.
30. Cf. Hnvwrr-, op. cit. supra note 23, at 33. Professor Shoup in CAPiTAL GAINS TAX-
ATiON 24 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946) ; Professor Seltzer, id. at 9.
31. Stanley S. Surrey, id. at 74. Cf. PAtU, T.AxArioN non Pnosrnxnv 272 (1946).
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the latter by calling it a taxable gain? 32 After all, when salaries are
raised in an inflationary period, we tax the increase in salary." 11
It would seem that the question "whether you get better distributive
justice in taxation by completely ignoring all the gains or losses or by
taxing all without making any adjustment for change in the price
level" 3" should be answered in favor of the latter alternative.
Under the former alternative--.e., if "investment" gains are to be
exempted because some are "inflationary" and therefore "illusory"-
there arises the question why the same reasoning would not also re-
quire the exemption of "speculative" and "business" gains. The
answer would probably be made that "speculative" and "business"
transactions are likely to be consummated more quickly than those of
the "investment" type and hence do not require equal relief against
substantial changes in the price level during the interval between
acquisition and sale. This generalization does not seem susceptible of
empirical verification. Furthermore, this argument is subject to the
criticism that the statute does not, in practical operation, distinguish
neatly between personifications of abstract concepts, such as "The
Businessman" and "The Investor." On the contrary, the law mul-
tiplies unjustified discriminations among people engaged in essentially
similar economic activities. 35
5. Changes in Interest Rates
Somewhat parallel to the "inflation" argument is the argument
against the taxation of gains resulting from a decline in interest rates:
32. Cf. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 156 (1938) ; Professor Groves in CAI'1-
TAL GAINS TAXATION 64 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
33. Surrey, id. at WO. Mr. Surrey's last statement is denied by Mr. Seligman apparently
on the ground that the tax on the increase in salary is paid in depreciated dollars, Id. at 75.
However, it would seem that if the entire amount of the salary increase were needed to
maintain the recipient's standard of living unchanged, then the added tax would be levied on
"illusory" income representing no increase in ability to pay. This also disposes of Mr. May's
contention that the treatment of capital gains "stands out" among the various types of income
in that no "adjustment" is made for general prices changes. Id. at 75. See also Mr. May's
comment on the LIFO method of accounting for inventories, id. at 23, and Professor Seltzer's
reply to it, id. at 76.
34. Professor Shoup in CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION 24 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
Professor Shoup continues: "Neither is quite satisfactory, and if it were possible to include
an adjustment for the price level changes, we could then tax surplus gains over and above
price level changes, and somewhat as in the excess profits tax carry-back provisions, allow a
deduction for a deficiency, that is, a failure to realize normal gain consistent with the change
in the price level." Unfortunately segregation of gain attributable to over-all price changes,
through the use of index numbers or similar devices, is probably unfeasible.
35. See, e.g., the following parallel cases discussed in Part I of this article: Brown v.
Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944) and United States v. Robinson, 129 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1942); Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942) and John W. Hogg, P-H 1944
TC Mem. Dec. 44,066 (1944).
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"Here is John Smith who bought $100,000 principal amount of
4Y2 per cent bonds at par fifteen years ago. ... At the present
time they would be selling on perhaps a three per cent basis ...
If John Smith sells them, in order, let us say, to shift his funds into
other bonds that he regards as safer or of more diversified matu-
rities, he will make a capital gain of about $20,000. .... 25
"If he pays part of that capital gain in taxes, the remaining pro-
ceeds of his bond sales will not [when reinvested] command as much
interest income as he previously received." r
Here again, from the mere fact that income will be reduced after the
"switching of investments," the conclusion is drawn that it is unfair-
even "immoral" s to tax such gains. Yet, as has already been indi-
cated, such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. One who sells an
earlier investment at a profit is in a stronger position than new investors
to cushion the effect of lower interest rates. "That comparative benefit
may justify a tax." 31
These arguments presuppose the reinvestment of the gain. But a
successful investor may, without reinvestment, live on the profit from
his sale.40 As his ability to command goods and services has increased,
it is not unfair to tax this increase. 41 Thus here too the supposed in-
equity of taxing investors' gains is highly questionable.
6. Countervailing Equitable Considerations
With respect to each of the several arguments advanced in support
of at least partial exemption of capital gains from progressive income
taxes, it should be noted that there are countervailing equitable con-
siderations in favor of the imposition of graduated rates upon capital
36. Similar in effect to a decline in the rate of bond interest is "seasoning of manage-
ment," i.e., a decline in the rate at which anticipated corporate dividends are capitalized in
determining stock values. "[A] company can go along earning the same amount and paying
out the full amount of dividends; and as the management is successful for one year, two
years, five years, or ten or twenty years, the value of the security goes up." Mr. Beardsley
Ruml in CAP.IT.L GAINS TAxATioN 70 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
37. Professor Seltzer, id. at 7.
38. '1 think it is immoral for a government artificially to reduce a rate of interest and
say people have made a profit out of it when actually they have suffered from it." Mr.
George 0. May in CAITAI. GAINs TAxAmIoN 72 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
39. Stanley S. Surrey in CAPrrAL GA Ns TAxATioN 72-3 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
40. To argue that this is unrealistic (because the typical investor seeks to prevent a
decline in his dividends and interest by reinvesting his capital gains) is to adopt Irving
Fisher's view that income is what a man spends for consumption purposes and "not what he
might consume if he wanted to." Professor Shoup in CAPITAL GIs TAXATIoN 78 (Tax
Institute Symposium, 1946). Cf. note 13 supra.
41. Professor Lawrence Seltzer in CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION 78 (Tax Institute Sym-
posium, 1946). "[T]he fact is that the person has $25,000 more to leave to his estate if he
dies, which is certainly an increment." Mr. Eustace Seigman, id. at 79. Cf. statements of
Professor Groves, id. at 73-4, and Professor Shoup, id. at 79-SO.
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gains. Even so confirmed an advocate of special treatment of capital
gains as Mr. George 0. May has recognized that "the great accumula-
tions of wealth by individuals in this country have largely been the re-
sult of capital gains, and the salary or wage-earning classes might nat-
urally feel that they were being unjustly discriminated against if they
were taxed on their salaries or wages and the large capital gains of the
very wealthy should escape taxation." 42
The regressive tendency of the present treatment of capital gains may
be seen from the fact that an 'individual does not find it to his ad-
vantage to employ the 50% "alternative rate" authorized in Section
117(c)(2) unless his "surtax net income" ' 3 (including net capital
gains) is large enough to be taxed at an effective graduated rate in
excess of 50%. Under the rate scale enacted in 1948, 44 the "alternative
rate" was of no assistance to an unmarried individual receiving less
than $22,000, or to a married couple receiving less than $44,000 41 who
elected to file a joint return and thereby to "split" their combined in-
come. 46 It is therefore apparent that the resultant 25% tax ceiling
benefits only relatively prosperous taxpayers and these in direct pro-
portion to their prosperity. Less affluent taxpayers benefit solely
from Section 117(b) which provides that only half of their "long term
capital gains" need be included in their "ordinary income."
The full significance of these provisions can only be appreciated in
42. May, The Taxation of Capital Gains, 1 HARv. Bus. REV. 11, 12 (1922).
"From a practical commonsense point of view there is something strange in tile idea
that a man may indefinitely grow richer without ever being subject to an income tax."
Douglas, J., dissenting in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 409 (1942), quoting from
Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 HARV. L. REy. 363, 376 (1922). Cf. State-
ment of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings before
Committee on Wals and Means on Hil. 6358, 77th Cong., 24 Sess., 1611, 1630-1 (1942).
"The corollary phenomenon is that a man may lose the greater part of his fortune and have
no deductible losses, so long as he has not realized those losses by sales, and the properties
in question have not become absolutely worthless." MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 81 (1945).
This symmetry is superficial; the property owner is usually free to realize losses and to
abstain from realizing gains as it suits his tax advantage.
43. INT. REv. CODE § 12(a).
44. INT. Ra,. CoDE §§ 11 and 12, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1948, § 101, 62 STAr.
111 (1948). Although capital gains were once taxed at 1Z 2%, J 206(b), Revenue Act of
1921, 42 STAT. 233, the present 25% maximum rate is at least as favorable in comparison
with contemporaneous surtax rates. "An important fact to be kept in mind is that during
a large part of the period in which the 121/ per cent [capital gain] rate was in effect, the top
surtax rate on ordinary income was only 20 per cent, whereas the present (1937] surtax rates
reach 75 per cent." Report of Subcommittee, Hearings before Committee ons Ways and
Means on Proposed Tax Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 37 (1938).
45. See United States Individual Income Tax Return for 1948, Form 1040, Schedule D.
46. The "income-splitting" provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948 are described in
SEN. RF.P. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1948).
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the light of the available statistics as to the distribution of capital
gains among the various income groups.
"In 1938, a fairly typical year, capital gains constituted less than
1 percent of the net income reported by persons with incomes under
$5,000, about 3Y2 percent of the net income of persons with incomes
between $5,000 and $25,000, and about 11 percent of the net income
of persons with incomes over $25,000.47
"Capital gains compose a larger proportion of income, the higher
the income .4  The income class from $100,000 to $1,000,000, for
example, reported in 1938 only about 2/1./ percent of aggregate net
income, but it reported nearly 19 percent of capital gains. It is plain
to see that the preferential rate for capital gains seriously interferes
with the progressiveness of the income tax." Obviously a more fa-
47. Cf. Fagan, Economics of Capital Gains Taxation, ProC. NAT. TAx Ass'N€ 113, 122
(1939).
These figures shed considerable light on the figures employed in support of the argument
that capital gains taxation is not required by revenue considerations. E.g., "The relative
unimportance of the capital gains tax as a source of revenue is demonstrated by the fact that
the peak amount realized in 1928 amounted to only 576 million dollars. Since 1934 the highest
annual revenues to be collected from this source was 202 million dollars in 1943, which
represented only 12% of total revenues from income and profit taxes." Schram, The Fallacy
of Taxes on Capital Gains, 161 CoD tLMClAL AND FxxAxCaL CaRonzz crx 2606, 2631 (1945).
Manifestly the low yield of the tax is attributable, not only to its low rates, but also to the
fact that capital gains represent only a small percentage of the income of an even smaller
percentage of the population. However, the utility of a tax cannot be measured solely by its
productivity; otherwise such poor revenue producers as the federal estate and gift taxes
would long ago have been replaced by a federal general retail sales tax. Even if unimportant
from a revenue viewpoint, the taxation of capital gains is justifiable on the grounds (1) that
"equity among individuals is impossible under an income tax which disregards such items of
gain and loss...." SuSoNs, PEESONAL I-'com. TAXATION 157 (1938), and (2) that "the
capital gains tax is designed not only to yield revenue directly, but also to prevent the avoid-
ance of other taxes." Statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Mcans o; H.R. 6358, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1611, 1630 (1942).
48. Cf. Professor Seltzer in CAprrAL GAINS TixArIo.N 12, 13 (Tax Institute Sympo-
sium, 1946). Conversely the recipients of smaller incomes realize a disproportionately large
share of capital losses, deduction of which is restricted by way of compensation for the leni-
ence shown towards capital gains. Su LE!-ENTAL R~roar o.T CAPir.%L GArNs Arm Lossns
OF THE Divsox OF IN-vSTIGATION OF THE JOINT COMmInIE ON INTnmnAL Rxv.-uE, 71st
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1929); GRovas, PosTrVAR T&XATION AND EcoNo1aC PROesnss 216
(1946). See also Lowndes, supra note 6, at 448.
49. This is accentuated by the fact that the law favors long-term over short-term gains,
and more than a proportionate share of long accruals are associated with the larger incomes.
Taxpayers -with net incomes of $25,000 and less report the largest percentage of gains from
assets held 1 year or less, while those taxpayers with net incomes of $50,000 and over report
the largest percentage of gains from assets held over 10 years. Report of Subcommittee,
Hearings before Committee on W~ays and Means on Proposcd Tax Revision, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 39 (1938). GRovEs, PosTwR TaxATIoNq AND Eco.Nouic Poonxss 214 (1946).
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vorable treatment of capital gains would interfere further by bene-
fiting primarily a small high income group." 50
Because justice in taxation requires that income tax rates be progres-
sive, a substantial burden of proof rests upon those who advocate
exceptions to this principle.5 It is submitted that the allegations re-
garding the unfairness of subjecting capital gains to graduated in-
come tax rates 12 have not yet been established by that fair preponder-
ance of the evidence which should be required to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of taxing all types of income to the same extent. 3
B. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS UPON THE
ECONOMY
Even if special treatment of capital gains is not required for reasons
of fairness, it might be defensible if it were needed to prevent sub-
stantial adverse repercussions upon the economy. Accordingly it is
necessary to inquire into the merits of the latter type of argument.
1. Deterrence of Potential Sales
The argument is frequently made that the imposition of any sub-
stantial tax on capital gains will tend to deter sales which would other-
wise take place. This argument receives support from several sources.
50. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 275 (1946). Cf. 1929 SUPPLEMENTAL REP., rupra
note 4, at 1-4.
These figures have an important bearing upon the validity of the argument that a "highly
preferential treatment [of capital gains] is desirable in order to preserve the only means left
whereby a poor man can get rich." Professor Seltzer in CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION 13-14
(Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). They suggest that it is rarely the "poor man" who bene-
fits by such treatment.
The tremendous tax savings afforded to taxpayers in the higher surtax brackets by the
capital gains provisions received widespread public attention when the Bureau of Internal
Revenue ruled that as an "amateur" writer, General Dwight D. Eisenhower realized long-
term capital gain rather than ordinary income upon the sale of the copyright to his memoirs.
"Thus General Eisenhower will pay about $520,000 less than would a professional writer,
if his memoirs bring him $1,000,000." N.Y. Times, June 2, 1948, p. 31, col. 5.
The public was shown the other side of the coin when the Bureau ruled that comedian
Jack Benny was not entitled to 25% capital gain treatment upon the transfer of his incor-
porated radio show from N.B.C. to C.B.S. Cf. article headlined "Oh, Rochester I Jack's
Tax Bill $3,080,000," N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 31, 1948, p. 3, col. 3-5.
51. This is because "[c]apital gains constitute real taxpaying ability to the recipient, no
less than equivalent income derived from other sources." 1938 Subcommittee Rep., suJpra
note 49, at 38.
52. Cf. note 44 .spra.
53. Professor Simons finds the case for special treatment so unconvincing that he attrib-
utes to its advocates a desire to facilitate the avoidance of progressive tax rates. According
to Simons: "If you don't like your surtaxes, look for loopholes in the tax base. If no
adequate ones are found, write to your congressman about capital gains taxes and tell the
world that they are ruining business. Don't waste breath on the surtaxes. Face the problem
realistically (but never frankly) for what it is, namely, a shortage of convenient loopholes."
Simons, Federal Tax Reform, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 20, 21 (1946).
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For example, a congressional committee concluded that, during the
years 1917 through 1921 when capital gains were treated no differently
from other types of income, "the very high surtax rates forbade the
taking of profits and encouraged the taking of losses." 5 Less plausible
is the assertion that the present "25 percent rate on securities held
more than six months is a real barrier to the fluidity of capital." 5
Nevertheless there is some merit in the argument that any tax in
excess of a nominal rate tends to discourage sales.
"[A] high capital gains tax is definitely a deterrent to realization.
How great it is, is another question, but certainly if I have a secu-
rity which is paying me dividends, and if when I sell it I am going
to pay in tax half the proceeds and have only half to reinvest, I
shall not be able to get the same income I had and, therefore, I
shall be torn between the desire on the one hand to keep my in-
come up, and on the other, to sell the stock before it begins to reach
the top; -1 so there is some deterrent." 5
It should be observed, however, that if special treatment of sales by
investors is required because of the alleged deterrent effects of high tax
rates, it would seem no less necessary both (a) in the case of sales by
"speculators" of property held for six months or less and (b) in the case
of sales by "businessmen" of "property held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers." Yet profits realized upon both (a) and (b) are subject to sur-
tax. One might well suppose that the incidence of deleterious economic
effects would not depend on the legal classification of the seller's
activities.
It is arguable, however, that, whereas a typical "investor" has the
alternative of enjoying a recurrent yield if he refrains from selling, a
"speculator" holding commodity futures or a "businessman" holding
an inventory of shoes has no choice but to sell if he is to get his money
54. RFPORT OF THE JOINT COMTITEE ON INT=ALRLv N..au TAxATio.' 43 (19-7).
Cf. SuPPLusmIEAL REP., supra note 4, at 8.
55. Franklin Cole in Carr. GA Is TA .XATIoN 50 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
That this impression is so widespread is largely attributable to the fact that many business-
men and attorneys have had personal experience with a deal which failed to go through be-
cause of what the seller considered to be his tax advantage.
56. "If the owner thinks that the security will go still higher, he should keep it, regard-
less of the tax. If he thinks that it is going lower, it will pay him to sell, as long as the tax
is less than 100 per cent. If he does not know what to think, he would still not know what to
think even if there were no taxation of capital gains." SHOtP, Ct al., FAcs.o Tu TAX
PROBLEzS 489 (1937). "However, if an individual plans to get out of the market, he will
want to get out as near the top as possible, tax or no tax. It is clearly in his interest to pay
the tax on a larger gain than on a smaller gain." Statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax
Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings before the Coininittee on [Vays and
Means on H.R. 6358, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1611, 1631-2 (1942).
57. Eustace Seligman in CArrA GAIxNS TAXATION 15 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
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out. Accordingly, the "speculator" and the "businessman" would not
be deterred from selling by the surtax on their sales profits. This
distinction can be no better than the categories upon which it is based.
Thus if the short-term "speculator" held stocks and sold them notwith-
standing the surtax, it was not because he had no alternative but merely
because he preferred a quick turnover of his capital at a narrow profit
margin to a dividend income from quasi-permanent investments.
In Gilbert v. Commissioner 18 the taxpayer's sale of preferred stock
which he received as compensation for his services as a building con-
tractor was treated as a "business" transaction, giving rise to ordinary
income or fully deductible loss, although he could have retained the
stock for whatever dividends they might have yielded. On the other
hand, in United States v. Robinson 19 the sale of timber inherited from
the taxpayer's father was treated as an "investment" transaction,
giving rise only to capital gain or loss, although Miss Robinson had
little real choice but to sell the timber if she was to realize any income
from it. Thus there appears to be no substantial correlation of "invest-
ment" with a choice between selling and not selling, and "business" and
"speculation" with the absence of such a choice. On the contrary,
there seems little in the character of the various classes of transactions
to justify so much solicitude for the deterrence of sales of capital
assets and so little for the deterrence of sales of other types of property.
Assuming however that "some deterrent" 1o exists even under the
present lenient treatment of capital gains, there remains the question
of its magnitude. It would seem that this depends less upon the ab-
solute size of the ceiling rate-now 25%-than it does upon the re-
lationship which that rate bears to the surtax rate applicable to the
seller's ordinary income. This has been demonstrated by Eustace
Seligman 61 as follows: Assume that a man holds stock upon which he
receives dividends of $100,000 a year. Assume further that, for tax
purposes, the cost basis of this stock in his hands is zero, so that if he
sells the stock, the entire sales proceeds will be subject to a 25% capital
gains tax. Therefore if he sells and reinvests the proceeds remaining
after payment of the 25% tax in another stock with the same yield,
he will receive yearly dividends of $75,000 instead of $100,000 because
his capital will have been depleted by 25%. This decrease in dividend
income is more likely to deter the sale if the stockholder's dividend
income is taxed at a 50% rate than if it is taxed at an 80% rate. This
can be seen from the fact that the decrease in dividend income from
58. 56 F2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932), reversing 21 B.T.A. 1245 (1931), discussed in Part I.
59. 129 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942), discussed in Part I.
60. Eustace Seligman in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 15 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946)..61. See Seligman, id. at 57-8; cf. George 0. May, id. at 54; Thomas N. Tarleau, i'd. at
56; Harry J. Rudick, id. at 57.
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$100,000 to $75,000 will cause a decrease from $50,000 to $37,500 in
dividend income remaining after payment of a 50% income tax and a
decrease from $20,000 to $15,000 after payment of an 80% income tax.
Thus, whereas the drop in dividend income remaining after income tax
is $12,500 with a 50% rate, it is only $5,000 with an 80% rate. As one
may assume that an investor will be less reluctant to sacrifice $5,000
a year than $12,500 a year, it follows that the capital gains tax is less
of a deterrent to a man subject to an 80% rate than it is to a man sub-
ject to a 50% rate.
This line of reasoning suggests that the present capital gains tax
is not likely to constitute a serious deterrent to sales of appreciated
stocks so long as surtax rates remain high. While they do, the alterna-
tive to a 25% maximum tax on the sale of stocks backed by undis-
tributed corporate earnings will often be a much higher tax on the
distribution of dividends.6 2 Reinvestment of the balance left after
the payment of the dividend tax would involve a much greater re-
duction in future income than the reinvestment of sales proceeds
after payment of the present capital gains tax 3 Thus any deterrent
effects of the partial tax on capital gains would seem in large measure
counterbalanced by the inducement to sell afforded by the partial
exemption.
Willingness to sell depends not only upon the relationship of the
capital gains rates to ordinary surtax rates but also upon the treatment
of gains accrued but unrealized by sale prior to the death of the prop-
erty owner. Section 113(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that when a legatee sells property "acquired by bequest, devise, or
inheritance . . . the basis shall be the fair market value of such prop-
erty at the time of such acquisition." Hence if an asset cost $1,000
originally, was worth $3,000 when its owner died, and was sold by his
heir for $3,500, the 25% maximum rate would apply only to a gain of
S500. The $2,000 increase in the value of the property which accrued
prior to death escapes the capital gains tax. Thus elderly property
owners are offered a substantial inducement for refraining from profit-
taking.6 4 This factor has great practical importance.
"[U]nwillingness . . . to make exchanges in the face of a high
tax is . . . perhaps more due to this loophole in the system than
62. Cf. Thomas N. Tarleau in CAPrrAL GAINs TAXATION 55 (Tax Institute Symposium.
1946). See also Report of Subcommittee, Hearings before the Connittee on Ways and
Means onl Proposed Tax Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1933).
63. Of course, if the distribution could be arranged so as to comply with the rather
strict requirements of a "partial liquidation", it would first constitute a tax-free return of
capital which would reduce the basis of the "redeemed" stock to zero and then would be-
come capital gain. See Part I, notes 235-237 of this article.
64. See discussion by Franklin Cole in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 49 (Tax Institute
Symposium, 1946).
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to the tax itself. If one is to be taxed eventually on the appreciation
of assets, he is less likely to defer an exchange than .. . [if] the
possibility exists of not being taxed at all." 65
If there is concern that the capital gains tax deters sales, this concern
may be alleviated substantially by elimination of the provision which
immunizes gains accruing prior to death.66 Otherwise reluctance to
sell will often be attributable to this opportunity for tax avoidance
rather than to the tax itself."7
2. Distortion of Market Values
The argument is often made that the taxation of capital gains re-
sults in artificially inflated prices for capital assets because the owners
of such assets which have appreciated in value may sometimes choose
not to sell them rather than pay the tax on their gains.6" However, even
if it be assumed that taxation deters the sale of appreciated assets, it
does not necessarily follow that "a deferring of sales . . . means a
subtle diminution in the floating supply of securities, which, in turn,
means that a bullish force is unleased that has nothing to do with the
intrinsic value or merit of the securities." 69
Many potential transactions are of a type which may be deterred
without any substantial influence on the market:
"The effect of the capital gains tax on the prolongation of a price
rise depends on whether it merely discourages people from switch-
65. Professor Groves in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 19 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
66. Appropriate amendments are discussed by VicxRY, AGENDA FOR PnoaRtssivE TAX-
ATION 140 (1947). Tannenbaum, Basis of Property Transmitted at Dcatlh-Nced for Re-
vision, 3 TAX L. REV. 166 (1947). Cf. discussion in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 39-42
Q(Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
67. This comment is always applicable whenever sales are postponed because of the
desire to retain use of tax money for as long as possible. Cf. VxcKRin, A(eNDA FOR PROGRES-
sivE TAXATION 144 (1947).
68. "To a considerable extent, the inflation of values which culminated in 1929 may be
attributed to this cause ... ." Cole, Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses for income
Tax Purposes, 14 TAX MAG. 583, 584 (1936). "Europeans blamed the stock market on the
mercurial temperament of the American people and on the violent changes in our weather.
The real culprit was the capital gains tax." Friedman, Memorandum in Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means onl H.R. 6358, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1656, 1662 (1942).
But see Hogan, The Capital Gains Tax, 9 TAx MAG. 165-6 (1931) : "While it may be
admitted that any tax, however small, based upon realized profits will to some extent cause
the postponement of profit-taking, it is rather difficult in the light of past events to subscribe
to the view that a 123/2 per cent tax on profits precipitated one of the most serious economic
crises in the history of the country. Especially in view of the fact that from 1913 to 1921
such profits paid a tax rate at times as high as 73 per cent, which it seems reasonable to as-
sume exercised a much greater restraint upon profit-taking than the 12Y2 per cent rate, and
yet we find no evidence during this period of nearly nine years of any inflation in security
values comparable to that which is now said to have resulted from the 122 per cent rate,"
69. Seidman, Income Taxes and Bull Markets, Barron's, Feb. 24, 1936, p. 3, col. 2.
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ing from one security to another or also discourages sales by persons
who would not at once buy some other security. The discourage-
ment of 'switching' sales clearly has little or no effect on the market
. . . [because] the purchase of one stock, which tends to increase
its price, is preceded or accompanied by the sale of another stock,
which tends to reduce the price of that stock.
"[Only] to the extent that the capital gains tax discourages sales
that would not have been followed by repurchases is the level of the
market affected." 71
Thus it would seem that the degree to which asset values are influenced
is not susceptible of simple generalization.
7'
If a capital gains tax deters people from cashing in on appreciated
investments, it should also in some degree deter them from entering
into transactions where appreciation rather than recurrent yield is
probable.72 Hence the alleged reduction in the "supply" of ,uch assets
would, at least in part, be balanced by a reduction in "demand" and
little pressure would be exerted on the market, either downward or
upward.
7 3
But this does not mean that the present capital gains tax has no
inflationary effect.
"[I]f the 25 per cent rate on capital gains, compared to rates up
to 70 or 80 per cent on ordinary income, is a barrier to selling, and
therefore cuts down supply, does it not also stimulate demand? Has
it not presented an inducement for people to get into the market as
a way to make money with only a small tax, and is it not accord-
ingly responsible to some extent for the boom itself?" 74
As there seems to be little doubt that the 25% tax ceiling "does en-
70. Paul, Hearings before Committee on, Ways and fans on H.R. 6358, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1631 (1942).
71. It may be significant that, despite the absence of a capital gains tax in Great Britain.
the British stock market "moves the same as ours." Harry J. Rudick in CAPITAL GAIns
TAXATIoN 63 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
72. However, the prospect of a future capital gains tax will not deter the purchase of
property to be retained until the purchaser's death. See discussion of IxT. Rmv. CoDo
§113(a) (5) supra.
73. "The fact should be stressed that the capital gains tax may not only increase the
reservation prices of certain assets but that it may also decrease the market demand, in the
schedule sense, for speculative assets." Fagan, The Economics of Capital Gains Taxation,
Peoc. NAT. TAX Ass'x 113, 120 (1939). "[Tjhe absence of stock offerings means the ab-
sence of demand for stocks too. It appears on both sides of the equation and consequently
may not greatly affect the trend in stock prices one way or the other." Professor Groves in
CAPITAL GAIs TAXATION 60 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). Cf. Eustace Seligman, id.
at 63. In opposition to this view, Professor Somers argues that the capital gains tax deters
sales to a greater extent than it does purchases and that therefore it exerts an inflationary
influence. Somers, An Economic Analysis of tMe Capital Gains Tax, 1 NAT. TAX J. 226,
227 (1948).
74. Roy Blough in CAPrrAL GAINs TAXATION 61 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
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courage [people] to go into the market to buy," 11 it would appear that
the present scheme bf taxing capital gains may well exert some infla-
tionary influence-not because of the partial tax but because of the
partial exemption.
The argument that the present capital gains provisions exert an
unhealthy influence on prices because they create "a greater number of
unwilling sellers" 71 is subject to still another criticism. If stock market
booms are intensified by even limited recognition of capital gains, then
market downswings are retarded by the limited recognition of capital
losses which historically 7  has accompanied limited recognition of cap-
ital gains. Less-than-full deductibility tends to reduce the incentive
to sell high-cost properties for the purpose of obtaining tax deductions.
Yet even such limited deductibility of capital losses has been thought
to accelerate a decline in market values.78 This alleged evil seems effec-
tively forestalled, however, by the $1,000 limitation upon the deduc-
tibility of net capital losses from ordinary income.19 True, the present
"carry-over" of net capital losses8" may invite tax selling where the
taxpayer expects to realize capital gains within the next five years.
But any depressive effect of such sales is likely to be at least partially
offset by the stimulus to reinvestment afforded by the prospect of
future gains which will be tax-free to the extent of the unused deduc-
tion for past losses.8"
3. Discouragement of Useful Transfers
Another type of argument predicated upon the assumption that the
taxation of capital gains acts as a deterrent to profit-taking is that
75. George 0. May, id. at 62.
76. Schram, The Fallacy of Taxes on Capital Gains, 161 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL
CHRONICL.E 2606, 2631 (1945).
77. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 160 (1938). Cf. REPORT OF JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON INTERNAL RzVENUE TAXATION 7 (1927) ; Professor Lawrence 1-. Seltzer in CAPITAL
GAINS TAXATION 13 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946) ; Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital
Gains and Losses under the Federal Income Tax, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 440, 448 (1948).
78. "[Ifn a recession, by switching from one stock to a similar stock, speculators and
investors could realize capital stock losses without sacrificing the chance for future recov-
ery. . . . [I]f simultaneously with the sale of one stock, another is bought, no general
pressure ipbn the market results. However ...some stockholders in periods of recession
sell to establish losses, but, expecting further declines, wait for a chance to buy at still lower
prices. [But] if stockholders expected a further decline in the price of stocks, they would
sell and buy in at a lower level regardless of the existence of a capital gains tax." Fagan,
The Economics of Capital Gains Taxation, PROc. NAT. TAX ASs'N 113, 121 (1939) ; cf.
Cohm & Lehman, Economic Consequences of Recent American Tax Policy, SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH, Supplement 1, p. 68 (1938).
79. INT. REv. CODE § 117(d) (2). Cf. Paul in Hearings before Committee on Ways and
Means on H.R. 6358, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1631 (1942).
80. INT. REv. CODE § 117(e).
81. Cf. Paul, supra note 79, at 1631.
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espoused by the late Andrew Mellon while Secretary of the Treasury.
In his illustration, the holder of a parcel of real property which has
appreciated in value is attracted by an offer from a purchaser "who
would improve it with buildings." Upon reflection, however, the sa-
gacious landowner decides to "keep the property [rather] than sell it,
pay the tax, and invest what is left in something else."
"What is the result? The transaction does not take place and
the community loses the advantage which would come in the stim-
ulation that would arise from the transactions resulting from the
buyer's improvement of the property, and it also loses the advan-
tage of the seller's putting his money into some other form of invest-
ment which in turn would give rise to business transactions." 82
Consequences such as these constitute a plausible argument against
capital gains taxation, not only because they are important, but also
because their causation is easily traced.
However, other less easily traced repercussions have been ascribed
to the taxation of capital gains, even under the present lenient 25%-
after-six-months scheme.
"I doubt whether those persons who wish to see a longer holding
period and a higher rate appreciate what the consequences would
be . . . [Wie already have gone as far as we can go safely. Any
more drastic interference with the transfer of capital assets would
check the flow of venture capital, would put a brake upon the op-
eration of job-creating processes, and would, in my judgment,
result eventually in a frozen economy." 81
This argument presumes correctly that if the taxation of capital gains
hinders the sale of appreciated property, such taxation will also often
deter the purchase of property acquired in expectation of future appre-
ciation. It also appears likely that progressive tax rates tend to reduce
82. REP. SEc. TREas. 19 (1921). It should be noted that Secretary Mellon's argument
was directed against the taxation of capital gains at full progressive rates without regard
to the duration of their accrual.
83. Schram, The Fallacy of Taxes on Capital Gains, 161 Coimmcrm mm F nAzm.Cr .
CHRoNiaE 2606, 2631 (1945). Cf. Nelson, Capital Gains Tax Damns Ris: Funds, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1948 § 3, p. 1, col. 4.
In support of this conclusion it is argued that under present law the Government enjoys
a "heads I win, tails you lose" position sis d -vis the taxpayer. "If a man makes 20,000 on
an investment in industry, he must pay a tax up to 25 per cent. But if he loses '-$20,000-and
does not have a capital gain to offset it--he is out of luck. Only $6,000-$,000 a year for sLx
years-can be deducted from his regular income. And the permissible deductions are no
bigger if he loses $100,000 or $1,000,000. That is his worry." Becldy, Taxes: Cutting Our
Nose to Spite Our Face, Newsweek, Dec. 19, 1949, p. 55. It should be observed that this
argument pertains to the treatment of capital losses, not capital gains.
For a less pessimistic view, see Somers, An Economic Analysis of the Capital Gains
Tax, 1 NAT. TAx J. 226, 232 (1948).
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the volume of private capital employed in profit-making ventures 4
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that partial exemption of
capital gains is an appropriate means of counteracting the possible
effects which graduated tax rates may have upon incentives. As a
subsidy to the productive utilization of private resources, both human
and financial, such special treatment operates capriciously. It fur-
nishes an incentive neither to the expenditure of energy in occupations
generating wage and salary compensation nor to the expenditure of
funds expected to yield income in the form of dividends, interest, rents,
and royalties. Furthermore, no direct encouragement is given the sale
of ordinary merchandise. These considerations should be kept in mind
in evaluating the contention that favored tax treatment of capital
gains is required to provide the incentives essential to a profit-moti-
vated economy." They suggest that such treatment furnishes an in-
centive only to owners of capital, and not even to all owners of capital
but only to those who are able to arrange their affairs so as to realize
income in the form of capital gains. The rest of the community is
afforded no incentive whatever.
As any tax on income can be considered a deterrent to economic
activity, it would seem that solicitude for capital gains is justified only
if taxation of this type of income is a greater deterrent to the utilization
of private resources than is the taxation of other types of income."
There appears to be little reason to think that incentives are affected
more adversely by the taxation of profits realized upon the sale of
property than by the taxation of compensation, dividends, and other
forms of income.8 Nor is it clear that taxation of capital gains realized
by investors has a more undesirable effect upon incentives than equal
taxation of ordinary profits realized by businessmen upon the sale of
"property held . . . primarily for sale to customers. .. ." It would
seem, therefore, that if risk-taking is to be accorded special treatment,
84. "Increased tax burdens . . . force users of capital to restrict their commitments to
undertakings in which the expected gross marginal return, before taxes, is higher than that
which was thought adequate before the tax increase. At any time there must, obviously, be
a smaller number of possible undertakings offering these higher marginal returns than those
offering prospects for lower returns. In addition, the degree of certainty with which this
higher marginal return can be expected is usually less .... This decrease in the degree of
certainty also operates independently to reduce the attractiveness and hence the volume of
current new investment." ANGELL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS CYC s 276 (1941).
85. See George 0. May in CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION 22 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
86. Paul in Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 6358, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1633 (1942).
87. "If the rates are too high to be good for incentives in one case, they probably are in
the other. Parity treatment for losses would be one way of compensating for equal treatment
of capital gains so far as the effect on enterprise is concerned." Professor Groves in CAPITAL
GAINS TAXATION 18 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
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methods more comprehensive than those of the present capital gains
law should be devisedS3
Even if it be true that the taxation of capital gains tends to deter the
sale of appreciated property, this may not be an unmitigated evil.
"[Mie can't be sure that some reduction in the amount of ex-
change, or the number of exchanges of investments, would be so-
cially bad. It is often observed that this buying of securities for
appreciation results in a very fleeting citizenship in American cor-
porations.P Stock owners often take very little responsibility and
acquire very little information about the companies they own be-
cause their ownership is so highly transitory. . ." ' "[This] re-
sults in further abdication of the stockholder to management.
i t" 91 "[It may not be] in the social interest for realization to be
entirely unimpeded by any tax laws and to be extremely easy
.. ." [if it is] "desirable to have more people regard stock as an
investment and less as a speculation." 92
There is a still more important reason for belief that the public
interest would not be affected adversely by the deterrence of some
types of transactions. Many individuals in the higher surtax brackets,
such as experienced corporate executives, have become increasingly
aware that, whereas their income from the pursuit of their vocations is
taxed at rates of perhaps 60% or 70%, whatever profits they may re-
ceive from long-term stock market operations will not be taxed in
excess of an effective 25% rate. Accordingly it seems probable that
much time, energy and capital has been channelled in the latter direc-
tion, and away from directly productive activities in business and the
professions.93 Although it is impossible to say how far this tendency
has progressed, the gravity of its implications for the future of private
88. Thus Mr. Rudick asks: "Assuming we are thinking of allowing a favorable rate
to gains from venture capital, is six-month capital really venture capital? Can a new
business actually get going in six months?" CAPrrAL GAINs TAxATi0.O 87 (Tax Insti-
tute Symposium, 1946).
89. "It is rare, one is told, for an American to invest, as many Englishmen still do,
'for income'; and he will not readily purchase an investment except in hope of capital
appreciation" KEYxES, Tn- GEEMIL THEORY OF E13PLOYvaENT, I.NT EST uND M1O.EY
159 (1936). According to Professor Groves, "the purchase of stocks for increment ...
means that stocks are valued by guesswork at the trend in the stock market and not ac-
cording to their inherent value; that aggravates stock market booms and depressions."
CAPITAL GAiNs TAXATioN 65 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
90. Professor Groves in CAprr.,L GAiNs T.,xA.,TzO 19 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
91. Id. at 65.
92. Id. at 60.
93. "[W]e have made speculation too cheap to keep the businessmen at work, since
if they put their earnings into businesses they are taxed at high rates, but they can speculate
at a 25 per cent rate." Roy Blough in CAPITAL GAINS TAxATIO," 87 (Tax Institute
Symposium, 1946).
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capitalism is readily apparent. 4 This phenomenon alone should raise
serious doubts as to the wisdom of a tax system whereby the intellectual
and financial resources of many potentially creative citizens are si-
phoned off from the more socially-useful types of activity."
4. Other Economic Considerations
Although hardly exhaustive, the preceding analysis of the unde-
sirable economic consequences alleged to flow from the taxation of
capital gains serves to indicate that these effects do not constitute a
sufficiently strong argument against this type of taxation," especially
if the applicable rates are as low as those prevailing under present law.
Whether such an argument could be made out if capital gains were
taxed more rigorously is, of course, another matter. Unfortunately,
however, adequate statistical data is not yet available from which the
magnitude of these effects at various rate levels might be calculated.
Even at a single rate level it is impossible to ascertain which of the
alleged repercussions are trivial and which substantial. This is be-
cause these repercussions are demonstrated by deductive reasoning
rather than by empirical research. Although unsatisfactory, this type
of analysis must be accepted until more refined methods are developed.
However, in view of the dearth of quantitative information as to the
relative importance of the contradictory economic factors, it would
seem that the principle of taxing all types of income to the same extent,
i.e., at graduated rates, should be permitted to control practical policy.
VIi. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion indicates that no satisfactory line has been
drawn between capital gains and ordinary income, either in practice
or in theory. Not only are the capital gains provisions seriously in-
efficient in attaining their presumptive end-the isolation and special
treatment of "investment"-but it is far from clear that this end is
worthy of attainment.
94. Cf. Professor Groves, id. at 65.
95. Roy Blough, id. at 86. This problem has given rise to the suggestion that corpo-
rate executives would be less likely to stray from their jobs if their compensation were
taxed at capital gain rates when received through the medium of stock options and other
forms of bargain purchases. The objections to this suggestion are discussed in Miller,
The Treasury's Proposal to Tax Employees' Bargain Purchases: T.D. 5507, 56 YALE L.J.
706 (1947).
96. In this connection one should keep in mind that "[tJhe bulk of capital assets is
relatively insensitive to the character of our capital-gains taxation. This is true of the
part held quasi-permanently for purposes of control and income. It is also true of the
part employed in the short-term operation of traders and speculators. operations which
normally account for a large fraction of the total trading in listed securities. . . ." Report
of Subcommittee, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Proposed Tax
Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 9, 40 (1938). Cf. Fagan, The Economics of Capital Gains
Taxation, PRoc. NAT. TAX Ass'N 113, 120 (1939).
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Section VI has demonstrated that many of the arguments advanced
in support of favored treatment of "investment" gains may be refuted
by deductive reasoning. Other arguments lack empirical support.
Still others fail to mesh with the existing legal categories. It is sub-
mitted that, taken together, these arguments do not furnish adequate
justification for so substantial an exception to the principle of pro-
gression as is found in the capital gains provisions.
Sections I through V have indicated that, in addition to difficulties
concerning their theoretical bases, these provisions present substan-
tial difficulties in their practical application. The issue here has been
stated well by Professor Seltzer:
"There are many types of ordinary income that resemble capital
gains and vice versa to such an extent that to draw the line is
arbitrary. Is that true to such an extent that we ought to consider
removing the distinction between capital gains and ordinary in-
come?" 97
An affirmative answer to this question appears to be required by the
numerous and important anomalies described in Sections I through
V. These Sections also suggest that even substantial legislative and
judicial improvements in the criteria for segregating capital gains may
not be sufficient to eliminate such anomalies and that "any special
treatment of capital gains per se . . . requires introduction into the
law of arbitrary, unsatisfactory, and unnecessary distinctions." 11
It is submitted that capital gains should be taxed at the graduated
rates applicable to income received in other forms. Acceptance of this
conclusion does not, however, necessarily require a return to the pre-
1922 law under which capital gains were taxed at full progressive rates
in the year of realization regardless of the fact that some accrued over
several years or represented highly irregular receipts. Although even
this simple but crude method might well be preferable to the casuistic
complexities of the present scheme of taxing capital gains, a truly
adequate solution of the problem is probably unattainable without a
thorough revamping of the entire structure of the income tax.
It is common knowledge that such a solution depends, in large
measure, upon whether corporate profits can be integrated into the
personal income tax base in a manner more satisfactory than that
effected by the present irrational hodgepodge of corporate taxes," pen-
alty taxes,' ° and dividend taxes.'' Thus, if there could be devised
97. C'rrA. GAnms TA-xATiON 46 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
98. SmioNs, PERsoNAL IxcomE TAxATIO 152. See also, id. at 150.
99. IN. REv. CODE §§ 13, 14 and 15.
100. INT. R-v. CODE §§ 102 and 500.
101. Iirr.EV. CoDE§22(a).
Cf. How SHALL CORPORAtTIONS BE TXRP? (Tax Institute, 1947); GoODE, TuE
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some feasible method of taxing stockholders, like partners, on all cur-
rent earnings regardless of distribution,1 2 the accompanying upward
revision of the cost "basis" of the stock would substantially reduce the
amount of the gain recognized for tax purposes when the stock is later
sold.' 1 3 This would eliminate much of the hardship which otherwise
might result from the application of progressive rates to gains realized
upon the sale of assets held for longer than one year. Mitigation of the
impact of the surtax upon irregular and "pyramided" income might
also be effected by employing as the tax base, not the income of a
single year, but an average of several years' income."0 4 If all types of
income were averaged, many of the arguments advanced in support of
special treatment for capital gains would lose whatever force they may
now have. 05 It may also be feasible to modify the existing rule that
gains are taxable only when realized by sale or exchange."I
The proper treatment of losses realized upon the disposition of
"capital assets" presents a more difficult problem. Fairness seems to
PosTWA CORPORATION TAX STXucTuR. (Treasury Dep't, Division of Tax Research,
1946) ; VicaxREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 150-63 (1947); GROVES, POSTWAIt
TAXATION AND EcoNomic PROGRESS 20-73 (1946) ; Final Report of the Cominttee of th
National Tax Association on Federal Taxation of Corporations, PROC. NAT. TAX ASS'N
534, 632 (1939). Westfall, Integrating Federal Income Taxes on Corporations and their
Shareholders, 27 TAXES 236 (1949).
102. Cf. INT. REV. CODE § 182. See the proposals made in How SIIALL CORrOuATIONS
BE TAXED? 42-3, 51-2, 61-90 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1947); VICKREV, ACGNDA Foil
PRoGa'ssrvE, TAXATION 159-62 (1947); GROVES, PosTwAR TAXATION AND EcONOMIC
PROGRESS 55-9 (1946) ; PROC. NAT. TAX Ass'N 555-6 (1939) ; Devine, Taxing Corpora-
tions as Partnerships, 26 TAXES 506 (1948). Cf. DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bail-Outs"
and the Inconw Tax, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1126, 1138 (1949).
103. "If all holders of stock were required to pay tax on their pro rata share of corpo-
rate income as it accrues to the corporation, and were permitted to add undistributed
corporate income on which they had been taxed to their basis for gain or loss on subsequent
disposition of the security, the heart would be cut out of the capital gains problem. It
would then be generally satisfactory to tax such gain as ordinary income in the year of
its realization. .. ." James, Irascible Comments on the Revenue Laws, 9 U. ov Cil. L..
REV. 58, 70 (1941) ; cf. Parker, Capital Gains and Losses, 14 TAX MAG. 604, 610 (1936).
"Such a tax, if it could be upheld against constitutional attack and successfully ad-
ministered ... would eliminate the entire problem of the accumulation of corporate sur-
pluses to avoid surtax on the individual stockholders. The always unsatisfactory Section
102 and the highly controversial tax on undistributed earnings would be simply unneces-
sary." Furthermore this system would remove "the present pressure of the corporate
income tax ...toward fixed debt and away from equity financing ... " James, supra,
at 67, 69. For further details, see id. at 68-71.
104. See note 11 supra.
105. See Section VI supra.
106. A step has already been taken in this direction. I.T. 3910, 1948-1- Cum. BULL.
15; I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 7, discussed in Note, Gratuitous Disposition of Property
as Realization of Income, 62 -ARv. L. REV. 1181 (1949) ; Miller, Gifts of Income and of
Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5 TAx L. REV. 1 (1949). Cf. James, Irascible
Comments on the Revenue Laws, 9 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 58, 71 (1941).
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require that losses of this type be reflected in taxable income to their
full extent as are losses of other types, e.g., losses sustained in the oper-
ation of a business 'Ol and losses resulting from casualties such as fire
and flood." The case for this treatment of capital losses would become
very strong if all capital gains were taxed at progressive rates. ' How-
ever, when the deduction of capital losses from ordinary income is
permitted,"0 "the taxpayer then adopts an opportunistic policy, and
takes gains only when it doesn't cost a tax [because offset by contem-
poraneous lossesJ, and takes losses to offset gains, dividends, interest
and salary." "' Such "tax sales" might well jeopardize the yield of the
income tax during periods of falling prices."u 2 "Mforeover from the
standpoint of capacity to pay, it does not seem fair that a person who
has a large amount of ordinary income should pay little or no tax,
simply because he is able to shift his investments in such a way as to
show tax losses, when such methods of avoidance are not open to other
taxpayers whose incomes consist chiefly of earnings and the like and
who do not owvn any considerable amount of capital assets on which
losses have accrued." 113 Although no completely satisfactory solution
is as yet apparent,1 4 the introduction of a system of averaging might
well ameliorate this problem. "5
107. 1xm. Rm% CoDE §23(e) (1).
108. IT. REV. CODE § 23(e) (3).
109. Cf. Harry J. Rudick in CA.rTAL GAiNs TAXATioN 44 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
110. See discussion in Section I supra, concerning the reasons for the 1934 amendment
to the "trade or business" clause.
111. Cf. Harry J. Rudick in CAIrrA. GAINs TAxATioN 44-5 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946); Latham, Taxationz of Capital Gains, 23 CALIF. L. Rnr. 30, 34 n.13 (1935). From
this phenomenon Mr. Rudick draws the conclusion that less-than-full recognition of both
capital gains and losses is "in the interests of the revenue." CAPITAL GANS TAXATI N
at 45.
112. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; 1939-1 Cuw. BuLL., pt. 2, pp. 457, 503.
Morgenthau in Hearings before Committee on, Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5--b
(1933) ; Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Capital Gains and Losses, 49 HAn%. L REv.
262,281 (1935).
113. Hendricks, supra note 112; cf. Fagan, The Economics of Capital Gains Taxation,
Poc. NAT. TAx Ass'x 113, 125 (1939). For a contrary view, see Lutz, Should Capital
Gains be Taxed as Income?, 22 BnuL.. NAT. TAX Ass'x 130, 134 (1937).
114. One possibility would be to provide that losses resulting from transactions in
securities and real estate (the principal subjects of "tax sales") could he used only to
offset fully taxable gains realized upon these types of property. If losses exceeded gains,
the net loss could be carried forward as an offset against gains realized in later years,
much as net capital losses are now carried forward. However, this solution is not very
satisfactory because like the present law, it requires that a distinction be made between
losses which could be deducted from ordinary income and losses which could not. Hear-
ings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 6353, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1611,
1635-6 (1942); cf. Paul, id. at 13-14; Fagan, supra note 113, at 125.
115. See note 11 supra. See Bravman, supra note 11, at 26: "fljndividuals may not
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The above comments are intended, not as a detailed blueprint of an
ideal tax system,1 6 but merely as an indication of some of the adjust-
ments which might appropriately accompany the elimination of the
present capital gains provisions. In considering which adjustments
would be desirable, at least two objectives should be kept in mind.
First, that it is necessary "so to arrange matters that precisely the same
tax liability will arise no matter when the taxpayer carries through his
transaction and no matter what form he causes the transaction to
assume." Second, that it is necessary "to evolve a method of pur-
chasing mobility at a lower cost in terms of equity." 117 Both of these
ends must be pursued simultaneously. To assert that they are in-
compatible is to deny that a private enterprise economy can function
efficiently under an equitable system of taxation.
Pending thoroughgoing legislative changes in the treatment of capital
gains and losses, it should be the policy of courts and administrators
to apply Section 117 only to those situations which clearly are covered
by its terms. Where serious doubts as to its applicability arise, they
should be resolved in favor of the interpretation whereby gains will
be fully includible in ordinary income and losses will be fully deductible
from ordinary income. This policy could be implemented by a strict
interpretation of the words "sale or exchange," combined with a
liberal construction of the clause which excludes from the capital asset
category all "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." "1
In the absence of detailed analysis of the court decisions, it is not
feasible to elaborate here on the techniques available for the inter-
pretation of the "sale" and "exchange" concepts. However, on the
basis of the discussion in Sections II, III, and IV, it is possible to
generalize as to the proper construction of the "trade or business"
clause. This discussion indicates that several obstacles lie in the way
of a more inclusive interpretation of this clause.
be so apt, as under the existing scheme, to sell their capital assets merely to establish losses
for tax purposes. These transactions could be deferred and later consummated for business
reasons only and the individual would still obtain the same tax benefit provided he con-
tinues to average his income."
116. In an unpublished monograph Professors Carl Shoup and William Vickrey of
Columbia University have examined thirteen methods of taxing capital gains and losses,
finding none completely satisfactory.
117. Haig, Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1937, p. 4, col. 4. "Fortuitous minor in-
equalities cannot wholly be excluded; but there must be no opportunities for deliberate
systematic avoidance on a large scale, i.e., for altering substantially one's tax liabilities
without change in one's real income circumstances." Cf. Simons, Federal Tax Reformn, 14
U. oF Cm. L. Ray. 20, 21 (1946).
118. INT. REV. CODE § 117 (a) (1). The clauses excluding various other classes of
property from the capital asset category, e.g., depreciable property and stock in trade, do
not seem as susceptible of expansion and contraction as the "trade or business" clause.
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Probably the most serious of these obstacles is the statutory require-
ment that property which has not been "held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale" is to be classified as a capital asset." 9 This requirement is
troublesome largely because the courts apparently have assumed that
its meaning is self-evident and have failed to appreciate its latent
ambiguities. The statute is far from clear, however, as to the precise
point in time at which the intention to sell must predominate over all
other plans with respect to the property. From the fact that the statute
does not employ the phrase "acquired by the taxpayer primarily for
sale" the inference may be drawn that property need not fall into the
capital asset category merely because its sale was not the primary
purpose of its acquisition. 120 On the other hand, the property must have
been "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale" at least during the
interval between the decision to sell and the consummation of the
sale. 121 Hence it would seem that this requirement may not be alto-
gether inflexible.
22
Less formidable impediments to the broadening of the "trade or
business" clause are the grocery-store 123 connotations which cling to
the phrases "trade or business," "ordinary course," and "sale to
customers." If a statute should be construed so as to give some effect
to each of its provisions, then the "trade or business" clause should not
be interpreted as merely duplicating the preceding clauses which
exclude inventory and stock in trade from the capital asset category, 2
But far more persuasive than this hoary maxim should be the economic
fact that profit or loss realized upon a sale has neither more nor less
effect upon the seller's ability to pay taxes because the sale was isolated,
or nearly so, rather than recurrent, or because the buyer might not
colloquially be called a "customer." For these reasons it is desirable
that the mere absence of prior sales of similar property should not
119. Of course, if an asset happens to constitute real or depreciable property used in
the taxpayer's trade or business, and has been held for more than six months, then it comes
within the operation of § 117(j).
120. The "trade or business" clause in I,-r. REv. CODE § 117(a) (1) refers, not to the
purpose for which property was "acquired," but to that for which it was "held." "[T]he
intention of Congress . . . vwas to include in the comprehensive word 'held,' property
which might or might not have been purchased primarily for the purpose of resale."
Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1936).
121. But "[ilt should take no long argument to show that the isolated fact of the role
is not a conclusive indication of the purpose for which the property was held. .. ." Resnid:,
Tax Problems in Liquidation Saks, 26 TAXEs 1109, 1110 (1948).
122. Cf. Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 56 F2d
361 (1st Cir. 1932), reversing 21 B.T.A. 1245 (1931); Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143
F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
123. "The analogy to groceries is particularly strong." Professor Groves in CAPITL
GAnxs TA ArioN 17 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
124. Cf. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 361 (Ist Cir. 1932).
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foreclose the possibility of a "sale to customers in the ordinary course
of trade or business." 125
However to exorcise the bogey of non-recurrence is not to deprive
"sale to customers" of its intended effect. As was indicated in Section
I of this discussion, this phrase was inserted in the statute so that
long-term stock market losses incurred by professional speculators
could not be used to offset ordinary income but would be subject to
the restrictions applicable to the deduction of capital losses."'0 In the
light of this legislative history, "sale to customers" must be interpreted
so as to remove from the scope of the "trade or business" clause all
transactions conducted over an impersonal securities or commodities
exchange. Although it is clear that these transactions are not sales
"to customers" within the meaning of the statute, the intended scope
of the "to customers" requirement is not clear with respect to other
types of sales. However, the legislative history is barren of any sug-
gestion that Congress wished "sale to customers" to be interpreted so
as to refer only to repeated sales of merchandise to a regular clientele.
The preceding paragraphs indicate that the "trade or business"
clause possesses important and relatively unexplored potentialities
for expansion. The development of these potentialities requires the
exercise of considerable discretion. Thus it appears unfeasible to alter
the status of transactions for which Congress clearly intended favored
treatment, such as gain realized upon the sale of a home or upon the
sale of securities held by the "average small investor." However with
respect to transactions for which Congress intended no special benefit,
the available techniques of interpretation should be employed to extend
the coverage of the "trade or business" clause so that gains will be fully
includible in ordinary income and losses fully deductible from ordinary
income. 12.
Would this policy be successful in the courts? Probably only to a
limited degree. It should not be overlooked that the statutory defi-
nition of "capital assets" is a residual classification. The statute does
not purport to say what a "capital asset" is, but only what it is not;
what is described is not the doughnut but the hole. Section 117(a)(1)
enumerates certain classes of property, the sale of which gives rise to
ordinary, i.e., business, income or loss and provides that all other
125. Cf. Gilbert v. Commissioner, supra note 124; Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143
F2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
126. Report of Conference Committee on H.R. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, quoted in
0. L. Burnett, 40 B.T.A. 605, 609 (1939), aff'd in part, 118 F.2d 659 (Sth Cir. 1941);
Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 368 (4th Cir. 1944).
127. As Judge Learned Hand remarked, "[tihere is no surer guide in the interpretation
of a statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of
over solicitude for the letter than to wince at carrying out that purpose because the words
used do not formally quite match with it." Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Tremaile,
133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943).
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property falls into the catch-all "capital asset" category.'2 Thus the
capital asset concept includes a great many factually diverse kinds of
property which have little in common to merit a uniform, peculiarly
favorable tax treatment.
No doubt the reason for this silhouette scheme was the difficulty
inherent in attempting to specify with precision just what types of
transactions were to receive special consideration. This difficulty, in
turn, sprang from the muddiness of the rationale for favored tax treat-
ment of capital gains. Other than a few elliptical and superficial sen-
tences scattered throughout congressional hearings and reports cover-
ing nearly thirty years, there is no comprehensive statement of what-
ever policies may constitute the raison d'etre of segregating capital
gains and losses. Consequently, a court is confronted with the task of
applying rules in relative ignorance of the reasons for them when
asked to decide whether some novel set of facts produces capital gain
or ordinary income. No wonder, then, that the courts have played with
words like "business" and "customers" in a futile attempt to find
answers which even a well-drafted statute would not yield if read in a
vacuum. There has therefore been a tendency to let whatever passed
through the coarse "trade or business" sieve fall into the "capital
asset" bucket. Courts should reverse this approach and allow into
the select class of capital assets only those assets which fall outside
the scope of a broad "trade or business" clause.
However, the prospect for the future is not hopeless. At least one
valiant, although unsuccessful, attempt has been made to interpret
the capital gains provisions in accordance with the available evidence
of congressional intent. In .AcAllister v. Conmmissioner,1 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the income beneficiary of a
testamentary trust would realize mere capital gain if the lump sum
paid to her by the remainderman for the surrender of her rights under
the trust exceeded the commuted value of those rights.zo In dissenting
from this view, Judge Frank contended that the entire sum received by
the income beneficiary should be taxed at progressive rates as ordinary
income, principally on the ground that it constituted a mere "substi-
tute for future payments which would be taxable as ordinary income,
and resembles the advance payment of dividends, interest, or sal-
aries." ' In support of his position, Judge Frank argued that the
capital gains provisions should be construed in the light of the reason
128. Section 117(a) (1) begins: "The term 'capital assets' means property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include
stock in trade... '
129. 157 F2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. dcnicd, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
130. Apparently INT. REv. CoDE § 113(a) (5) was thought to be applicable. See dis-
cussion in Section VI mupra.
131. MxAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1946).
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given for their enactment, i.e., Congress' belief that transfers of certain
types of "capital investments" were being deterred by the taxation of
any resultant profit at progressive rates. Applying this test to the case
of the trust beneficiary who accepted a lump sum in lieu of her life
interest, he concluded that it was "most unlikely that Congress in-
tended by § 117 to relieve such a taxpayer of ordinary tax burdens, to
supply an incentive for the demolition of such a trust." 132
Although Judge Frank's opinion in the McAllister case is concerned
with the "sale or exchange" aspect of the capital gains provisions, the
same mode of analysis is equally applicable to the "trade or business"
clause. By directing attention to the underlying reasons which suppos-
edly justify the special treatment of capital gains, this approach would
not only provide a safeguard against many of the resultant forms of
abuse,'33 but would also compel a continuing re-examination of those
reasons. This might well furnish the impetus for legislative revision.
A fresh approach is vitally needed in this area where so much thought
has been devoted to the letter of the law and so little to its spirit.
132. Id. at 241.
133. "If such an attitude should gain ground in the courts, it would be a mere matter
of time before any scheme or device to convert ordinary income into capital gain would be
doomed." Brodsky, Planning Business Transactions to Produce Capital Gains in PROcaMI-
INGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTrrUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
302,319 (1949).
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